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| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 10:34 PM PDT
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| Gardaí close in on 'mastermind' of cold-case murder Posted: 08 Jul 2019 10:34 PM PDT
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| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 09:17 PM PDT
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| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 09:00 PM PDT
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| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 08:21 PM PDT
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| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 07:09 PM PDT
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| SimpleViewer | Spectacular image galleries made simple. Posted: 08 Jul 2019 07:06 PM PDT | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| You have a few hours left to save 60%. Posted: 08 Jul 2019 04:49 PM PDT
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| Jeffrey Epstein’s reversal of fortune Posted: 08 Jul 2019 04:37 PM PDT
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| Music Festival Charging Whites Double CANCELS Policy After Backlash Posted: 08 Jul 2019 04:17 PM PDT  | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Posted: 08 Jul 2019 03:25 PM PDT
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| Get Instant Traffic To Your Website Today Posted: 08 Jul 2019 02:46 PM PDT
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| Female RCMP staff reach $100-million settlement in harassment lawsuit Posted: 08 Jul 2019 02:04 PM PDT
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| Popular Mobilization Force Reform in Iraq (Knights | Defense Post) Posted: 08 Jul 2019 02:00 PM PDT POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCE REFORM IN IRAQ: REINTEGRATION OR CONSOLIDATION OF MILITIA POWER? by Michael Knights Defense Post Recent decisions by the Iraqi PM to curtail the PMFs influence may just swap one threat for another. READ THIS ARTICLE ON OUR WEBSITE On July 1, Iraq's Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi issued his first executive order on the issue of reforming the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic), the mixture of Iran-backed militias and new volunteers raised as a reserve army to fight Islamic State five years ago. In late June, I returned from my third research visit to Iraq this year, where I had an opportunity to speak at length to Prime Minister Mahdi and other Iraqi leaders about the forthcoming PMF reform plan. Iraqi leaders recognize that the PMF is in danger of damaging its reputation inside Iraq if it is not brought under control, both in terms of cracking down on mafia-like economic activities and stopping unauthorized attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on neighboring states. Mahdi's 560-word executive order briefly outlines a broader and more detailed plan that has been under development for nearly a year. The plan has the potential to either reduce the risk from militias or dangerously consolidate their power, depending on how it is implemented. The July 1 order, and an earlier prime ministerial statement on June 18, forbid a range of activities by the armed volunteer units. PMF units must not maintain bases unless they are expressly authorized by the state, nor may they have economic offices or money-making ventures. They should not move forces, store weapons or manufacture arms "outside the knowledge, administration and control" of the prime minister. Any armed faction operating outside these rules should be "considered outside the law and accordingly prosecuted." Though not stated yet in public, the PMF are also expected to gradually redeploy from their numerous small bases to larger cantons, as security conditions permit. This means that predominately Shia PMF units from the south of Iraq will, within the next year or two, be progressively withdrawn from areas like the Syrian border region and Islamic State "hot spots" like Nineveh, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Anbar. In the notional scheme being envisaged by Iraqi leaders, the PMF units would be withdrawn to four canton areas: the circle of rural districts outside Baghdad; Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad; the shrine city of Samarra, north of Baghdad; and the desert flank from the shrine city of Karbala all the way to the Saudi border. In essence, the PMF would be pulled back from Sunni-only areas to form a defensive belt between Sunni-majority Iraq and the Shia areas. A test case is being undertaken this week to lower the profile of PMF units in Christian areas near Mosul, a clear gesture towards U.S. sensibilities regarding minorities near the city. A full-scale redeployment is a tall order and would take years to implement. It will require Iraqi Army forces to be sent north to backfill the PMF, leaving fewer non-PMF units around the government center in the capital. Iraq has a history of military coups, and there is still lingering political mistrust of the military among older political leadership. However, removal of the army from Baghdad could simply make the government more vulnerable to PMF pressure instead, swapping one threat for another. There is also a risk that a PMF consolidation program could benefit the central leadership under Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the operational leader of the PMF and a U.S.-designed terrorist. At present, the PMF are fractured into 60 or so units, limiting Abu Mahdi's grip. The consolidation program, which includes the shedding of individual militia names, will centralize authority that is presently wielded by Abu Mahdi. Nor is justice likely to be independently applied to PMF-related militants who break the new rules. Abu Mahdi and another Tehran-backed player, Abu Zaynab al-Lami, run the internal affairs wing of the PMF, which is charged with cracking down on offenders. As a result, the imposition of internal discipline is likely to benefit leaders supported by Iran more than any other faction. The U.S. must now balance patience and the maintenance of pressure in its dealings with the Iraqi government on these issues. Iraq's leadership should be quietly commended for beginning this process and laying out such an ambitious agenda, but the proof is in implementation. To reduce the risk of unintended and negative consequences from the PMF reform effort, the Iraqi government—encouraged and supported by its international security partners—should begin to gradually transition the mid-level leadership of the PMF into the hands of a broader range of factions, including non-political figures and leaders nominated by major shrine foundations. In time, figures like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Abu Zaynab al-Lami, who have plenty of rivals, could be isolated and eased out. The sanctioning of some Iran-backed Iraqi militia groups—which is likely this summer—may be less contentious than before, being that groups such as Kata'ib Al-Imam Ali (led by the U.S.-designated terrorist Shibl al-Zaydi) will no longer have any units of the PMF named after them. One early sign of seriousness that the Iraqi government could show would be the re-entry of government security forces into the bases previously monopolized by the larger Iranian-backed PMF units. For instance, the Iranian drones launched against Saudi Arabia pipelines came from Jurf as-Sakr, a military zone just outside Baghdad in which Abu Mahdi's faction, the U.S.-designated terrorist movement Kata'ib Hezbollah, denies the Iraqi government any access. If Iraq is serious about PMF reform, this base and others run by Badr, Kata'ib Al-Imam Ali, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq should open their doors to immediate inspection to show they are under state control. Michael Knights, a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, has spent long periods working in Iraq since 2003, including considerable time embedded with the country's security forces. This article was originally published on the Defense Post website. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500 WASHINGTON, DC 20036 202-452-0650 202-223-5364 (fax) www.washingtoninstitute.org Copyright 2019. All rights reserved. Tweet this item. Follow us on Twitter. 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| Deutsche Bank begins exciting new lopping-off-parts phase Posted: 08 Jul 2019 01:53 PM PDT
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| 'It's a boy!' Mario Lopez and wife Courtney welcome 'healthy, beautiful' son Santino Rafael Posted: 08 Jul 2019 01:13 PM PDT
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13 Years Since the Hezbollah-Israel War (Eisenkot | PolicyWatch 3150)
Posted: 08 Jul 2019 12:46 PM PDT
by Gadi Eisenkot
PolicyWatch 3150
July 8, 2019
On the anniversary of the 2006 conflict, a former IDF chief of staff assesses current power dynamics, risks, and opportunities along Israel's northern borders.
This March, Israel marked the seventieth anniversary of its ceasefire agreement with the state of Lebanon. On July 12, it will mark thirteen years since the outbreak of a war that began when Lebanese Hezbollah kidnapped two soldiers from Israeli territory and killed three others. Following thirty-three days of fighting, the balance of power on Israel’s northern border was irrevocably changed, while a penetrating discourse was stirred up regarding the government’s management of the conflict and the performance of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
This PolicyWatch will assess the war’s strategic legacy through two lenses. First, it will examine how the hostilities and their aftermath have affected the military capabilities and strategic position of Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force in the context of their mission against Israel. Second, it will discuss Israel’s strategic achievements and challenges since the war, and how the country should proceed in light of them.
THE POSTWAR BALANCE OF POWER
Shortly after the war, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah candidly told an interviewer, “We did not think, even one percent, that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude...If I had known on July 11...that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.” Yet while the border has seen thirteen years of relative quiet and stability since then, the group has continued to expand its robust arsenal and develop what it views as three crucial power multipliers:
- Precision capability for its missiles.
- A second front against Israel from Syria.
- An offensive plan to penetrate Israeli territory, both above ground and via tunnels.
The IDF has actively confronted these challenges in recent years, damaging the group’s capabilities and greatly hampering its plans. To counter the improving precision of Hezbollah rockets, the IDF has attacked missile production plants and stockpiles while taking open and covert action against weapons transfers from the group’s chief patron, Iran. And as Hezbollah and Tehran sought to establish a second front against Israel in the Golan Heights, the IDF struck deep along that frontier, establishing deconfliction mechanisms with Russian forces in Syria that allowed Israel to greatly reduce the capabilities of its enemies. Most recently, the IDF countered Hezbollah’s plans for underground incursions into Israel by launching Operation Northern Shield.
NEUTRALIZING THE TUNNEL THREAT
In late 2014, the first hints of a secret Qods Force/Hezbollah project came to light—a flagship plan for developing a massive system of underground attack tunnels. As part of a wider potential offensive, this network could have allowed thousands of troops to rise up from tunnels that stretched from inside Lebanon into Israeli communities, helping Iran and Hezbollah notch a strategic military achievement and advance their shared goal of harming and ultimately destroying the state of Israel.
For years, the IDF labored to accurately assess the number and location of these tunnels using combined intelligence capabilities together with technological, operational, and combat engineering resources. The fruit of this labor was Operation Northern Shield, which started on December 4, 2018. When the operation ended on January 13, the tunnels were destroyed and the underground threat to Israel’s northern frontier was neutralized.
Upon losing a tunnel system they had worked on for over a decade, the Qods Force and Hezbollah were clearly shocked—a reaction manifested in their denial of the project and their attempts to minimize the importance of a program that had been so central to their strategy. It is reasonable to assume that the exposure and destruction of this secret project has shown both groups the extent to which Israel has infiltrated their core secrets, likely strengthening Israeli deterrence in the eyes of Iranian and Hezbollah decisionmakers.
HEZBOLLAH SINCE 2006
In the years following the Lebanon war, Hezbollah focused on rebuilding Beirut’s Shia district of Dahiya and the villages of south Lebanon, as well as bolstering its own military capabilities and processing the lessons learned during the conflict. By 2011, the turmoil in the Arab world and the deteriorating situation in Syria led Iran to demand that Hezbollah forces assist Bashar al-Assad’s regime and support Iranian proxies in other regional struggles. An active combat role in Syria helped the group acquire valuable field experience in deploying formations at the company and battalion level.
The foreign interventions took a toll, however. After five years of fighting in Syria, some 2,000 Hezbollah operatives had been killed and 8,000 injured. Contrary to its past practice, the group resorted to using combatants as young as sixteen years of age, and many of these green recruits died in battle. In early 2018, Hezbollah began withdrawing forces from Syria, returning the majority of them home by year’s end. The group soon encountered internal divisions and severe economic problems that led it to sharply reduce the number of units it fielded, the social welfare programs it sponsored in Lebanon, and the wages it paid to personnel.
Even so, the group’s cooperation with Iran, especially the Qods Force, has only deepened. Perhaps the best illustration of this merger came in 2016, when the commander of Hezbollah forces in Syria, Mustafa Badreddine, was executed shortly after meeting with Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani at an Iranian base near Damascus. The decision appeared to reflect the wishes of both Soleimani and Nasrallah; since then, the organization has functioned without an independent military chief of its own.
ISRAEL ACHIEVED MOST OF ITS STRATEGIC GOALS
The central dilemma facing the Israeli security cabinet on the eve of the 2006 war was defining the campaign’s main target—was it the state of Lebanon, Hezbollah, or both? In the end, the IDF recommended six campaign goals, and the cabinet approved them:
- Strengthening Israeli deterrence in the region.
- Halting terrorism from Lebanon’s sovereign territory.
- Forcing the Lebanese government to take responsibility for the south.
- Pressuring Hezbollah to return the kidnapped soldiers.
- Causing significant damage to Hezbollah and its military capabilities.
- Keeping Syria and the Palestinian territories out of the war.
Thirteen years later, it can be said that most of these goals were achieved. Israeli deterrence is still strong, as demonstrated by the years of relative quiet on Israel’s northern border. The Lebanese government and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have taken some responsibility for the south. More broadly, Hezbollah was dealt a forceful blow after years of Tehran casting the group as a model for extending Iranian hegemony in the Middle East.
At the same time, Hezbollah has significantly increased its military strength despite the blow it suffered, even south of the Litani River—a space it was supposed to evacuate in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1701. Beirut and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have not fully established the sovereignty they are supposed to exert under that resolution, and the supervision exercised by UNIFIL is limited as well. On the political front, Hezbollah’s influence continues to grow within Lebanon.
LOOKING AHEAD
Even in the face of major IDF accomplishments during the war, the fact that Hezbollah was able to fire an estimated 4,000 rockets and missiles at northern communities sent shockwaves throughout Israeli society, raising difficult questions about the military’s level of preparedness. As outlined in a 2015 strategy document, this resulted in reorganization of the IDF and refocusing of intelligence resources, along with heightened readiness for future action against Hezbollah and protection of the home front.
Today, Hezbollah is capable of launching missiles into Israel on an even larger scale than 2006. Yet Israel’s defensive and offensive capabilities against the group have greatly improved, and the IDF enjoys major intelligence, aerial, and ground superiority—enough to ensure victory in a future conflict and make Iran and Hezbollah pay a heavy price.
Meanwhile, recent regional developments and heightened pressures on Iran have created an opportunity to roll back the Shia militia threat in the Middle East and bolster the state of Lebanon. In particular, Israel believes the following steps are crucial:
- Strengthen existing international peacekeeping efforts. The expected extension of UNIFIL’s mandate this August, together with increased efforts toward operational enforcement of Resolution 1701 in south Lebanon, would improve regional stability and constrict Hezbollah’s influence. Accordingly, the UN should reinvigorate the mandate of its peacekeeping forces in Syria and Lebanon by increasing the number of troops, expanding their authority on the ground, and placing stricter enforcement requirements on them.
- Press the LAF and Beirut to take responsibility. Because Lebanon’s military depends on foreign aid, donor countries can condition their contributions on the LAF becoming more active on two fronts: intercepting weapons transferred through Syria and increasing operations in Hezbollah strongholds south of the Litani River. Concurrently, the international community should pressure the civilian government to boost its sovereignty in the south and take full responsibility for what happens there.
- Press Iran to withdraw. The growing international pressure on Tehran has created an opportunity to push the regime into removing its forces from Syria and its “advisors” from Lebanon. Increasing the U.S.-led effort against Iran would also weaken Hezbollah’s strategic position, in part by limiting how much the group and its patron can influence Lebanon.
- Monitor the Lebanon-Syria border. In the interests of regional stability, international players should closely monitor this frontier to prevent the transfer of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. This task is especially relevant in light of last month’s trilateral summit in Jerusalem between the national security advisors of Israel, Russia, and the United States.
- Encourage Israeli-Lebanese engagement. The Israeli government should increase its efforts to promote shared interests with Beirut, such as drilling for gas in Lebanese waters and regulating land and maritime borders (with the exception of the contentious Shebaa Farms).
In short, the 2006 war yielded important strategic achievements for Israel, and as long as these achievements are maintained, stability on Israel’s northern border is likely. Moreover, the current situation facing Hezbollah, Iran, and the Qods Force may provide a strategic opportunity to further weaken their influence in Lebanon. Whatever the case, Israel must maintain its readiness and military superiority, both as deterrents to delay the next conflict and as instruments for decisive victory should conflict arise.
Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, a military fellow at The Washington Institute, retired from the IDF in January after serving as chief of the general staff.
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
1111 19TH STREET NW, SUITE 500
WASHINGTON, DC 20036
202-452-0650
202-223-5364 (fax)
www.washingtoninstitute.org
Copyright 2019. All rights reserved.
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NEWS ALERT: Detroit music festival reverses course after charging white people double admission
Posted: 08 Jul 2019 12:38 PM PDT
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.::|امن سرور - خانه امن رویاهای آنلاین شما|::.
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U.S.-Qatar Talks Likely to be Crucial to Iran Policy (Henderson | Policy Alert)
Posted: 08 Jul 2019 11:48 AM PDT
by Simon Henderson
Policy Alert
July 8, 2019
The Oval Office meeting between President Trump and Emir Tamim could have many agenda items but the regional tension with Tehran will be foremost.
When Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani goes to the White House on July 9, it will likely be with a sense of triumph. The Qatari leader has survived more than two years of diplomatic and economic isolation by his immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. And with its giant al-Udeid airbase, Qatar is now central to U.S. contingency planning for coping with the developing crisis caused by Iran's recent nuclear program violations and its attacks on oil tankers and pipelines.
Meanwhile, President Trump, who initially endorsed the Gulf blockade on Qatar—deemed to be "a funder of terrorism, and at a very high level"—has since spoken warmly of Doha, thanking it for both its hospitality at al-Udeid and multi-billion purchases of American weapons. And Emir Tamim's rivals, the instigators of the blockade, appear to be avoiding Washington. Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Salman remains embroiled in the controversy of the killing of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi and de facto Emirati leader, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi, earned a mention in the Mueller Report because of his Russian contacts.
But the Qatari leader's visit will not be without its own awkwardness. Doha remains tolerant of hate-speech in mosque sermons, textbooks, and particularly the Arabic-language output of its al-Jazeera satellite broadcasting station. Furthermore, Doha's balancing act includes funding for Palestinians in Gaza, with prospective agreements in the fields of defense, energy, investment and air transport—an arrangement agreed with and facilitated by Israel. And as with other Gulf countries, there continue to be concerns about Qatar's actions on terrorist financing. Even if passed over in the White House, these subjects are sure to come up in the Qatari leader's meetings with members of Congress and other parts of the Administration.
On Iran, Doha’s position is nuanced by the huge offshore gas field it shares with its neighbor across the Gulf. Tehran’s exploitation of its own portion has been delayed by the effect of sanctions while Qatar’s already established stream of revenues has transformed its economy and made it a player in international diplomacy, sport, and air travel. The aforementioned regional blockade has only increased the importance of maintaining overflight rights with Iran.
Yet Qatar has also been a good U.S. ally, readily hosting the extra B-52 bombers and F-22 stealth fighters sent out to the region in recent weeks, while other states have been more cautious. Its defenses have also been reinforced by extra Patriot missiles. As part of a developing trend, Washington has worked to lessen Doha's isolation; the Qatari finance minister was at the economic workshop in Bahrain last month, which discussed development aid to the Palestinians. Riyadh has returned liaison officers to al-Udeid but the UAE is a hold-out on such compromises.
The symbolism of the meeting is probably as much as can be expected. But assuming the usual access by the media scrum in the White House, it may also be an opportunity for President Trump to respond to the leaked assessments by the British ambassador Kim Darroch that his administration is "inept" and its Iran policy is "incoherent" and "chaotic." Governments across the world, as well as Tehran, will be hoping for some clarity.
Simon Henderson is the Baker Fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at The Washington Institute.
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BREAKING NEWS: Warren rakes in $19 million despite no fundraisers
Posted: 08 Jul 2019 11:02 AM PDT
Elizabeth Warren's presidential campaign announced Monday she raised $19.1 million in the second quarter of the year, more than tripling her first-quarter total despite holding no fundraisers.
The haul far exceeded expectations, as Warren surpassed both Bernie Sanders ($18 million) and Kamala Harris ($12 million) and came close to Joe Biden ($21.5 milllion). Her outpacing of Sanders is particularly notable, given the army of small-dollar donors he amassed in 2016 and their similarly progressive stances.
Read more: https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/08/warren-rakes-in-19-million-despite-no-fundraisers-1400058
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